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ABSTRACT
When a person dedicates his life to ending a practice he considers evil,
the state should not force him to promote that evil. Ever since the Supreme
Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette declared that
the First Amendment right to speak naturally implied the right not to speak,
the courts have sought to protect this right. As with all constitutional rights,
the debate is now where to place its limits. In A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy
Resource Clinic v. Harris, the Eastern District of California upheld an act
requiring any organization that performs pregnancy testing to inform its
clients that California provides low-cost access to abortions. The act
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mandates that the notice be put in a conspicuous place where individuals
wait and where it may be easily read by those seeking services from the
organization. The court in A Woman’s Friend framed the issue as a conflict
between the state’s ability to regulate the medical profession and the free
speech rights of the organization.
A couple years before A Woman’s Friend, the Second Circuit dealt with a
similar situation. In Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, New York City
passed a law that required pregnancy service centers to inform clients that
the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene encourages
women who are, or who may be, pregnant to consult with a licensed
provider. The city’s act also required pregnancy service centers to tell their
clients whether they provided abortions or provided referrals for abortions.
The Second Circuit held that these two provisions passed neither strict nor
intermediate scrutiny. The Second Circuit reasoned that the New York City
law was forcing the pro-life organizations to advertise on behalf of the city.
The court held that the government could not mandate that one espouse a
government position on a contested public issue, finding that the city’s act
failed under both strict and intermediate scrutiny.
Contrarily, the court in A Woman’s Friend found that the California
Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and
Transparency Act (“the Act”) passed both intermediate and strict scrutiny.
The court in A Woman’s Friend attempted to distinguished its case from
Evergreen, and found that the California Act did not burden speech to the
extent that the law did in Evergreen. The court reasoned that the Act sought
to protect a different government interest that was more closely related to
providing women with information regarding their pregnancy. The court
found the Act’s language to be merely a neutral fact, not expressing an
ideological message. The court also found that the Act was less burdensome
on speech because the Act did not require actual speech, but only that the
message be posted.
But the Second Circuit’s Evergreen decision is not easily distinguishable
from A Woman’s Friend. Just like the situation in Evergreen, the required
postings in A Woman’s Friend compel a private organization to advertise on
behalf of the state, and against the private organization’s will.
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the passage of the California Reproductive Freedom,
Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (“the Act”), A
Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Resource Clinic discovered that it would have
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to post a notice in its waiting room advertising that California provided
low-cost abortions.1 This pro-life institution claimed that the Act violates
the compelled speech doctrine and the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause.2 Supporting its assertion, A Woman’s Friend looked to a case from
the Second Circuit, Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York.3 In that case, the
Second Circuit reasoned that it did not need to resolve the level of scrutiny
because the result would be the same under both intermediate and strict
scrutiny.4
The district court in A Woman’s Friend held that the Act satisfied both
strict and intermediate scrutiny.5 The district court attempted to distinguish
the case from the Second Circuit case in Evergreen, but the Ninth Circuit
later undermined many of its distinctions.6 While discrediting the district
court’s reasoning, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the core result of the district
court due to the Ninth Circuit’s creation of the Pickup factors.7 These
factors were designed to evaluate professional speech cases and the Ninth
Circuit’s version of intermediate scrutiny.8
The district court in A Woman’s Friend—and the Ninth Circuit in
affirming the case—has created a split between the Ninth and the Second
Circuits.9 To resolve this conflict, the reasoning of the Second Circuit
should prevail. The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Evergreen is more
consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance concerning compelled speech
cases. It recognizes the policy against states commandeering private
organizations for advertising purposes, and it recognizes the constitutional

1. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1179-80
(E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 669 F.
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016). When this writing process began, only the district court had ruled
on A Woman’s Friend. As this Note was being written, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and
within the past few weeks the Supreme Court of the United States has decided to hear the
case.
2. Id. at 1179.
3. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and cert. denied sub
nom. Pregnancy Care Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of New York , 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014).
4. Evergreen, 740 F.3d at 245.
5. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1206-07
(E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 669 F.
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016).
6. See infra Section IV.B.
7. See infra Section III.C.4.
8. See infra Section II.C.1.c.
9. See infra Section IV.A.

2017]

STATE ADVERTISING OF ABORTION

237

distaste for forcing a private organization to proclaim a message with which
it disagrees. Furthermore, the California courts have already been overruled
when they tried to force an organization to spread the message of a third
party.10 Therefore, the decision in A Woman’s Friend should be replaced
with the stricter scrutiny applied in the Second Circuit’s Evergreen case.
This Note covers the origins and expansion of the compelled speech
doctrine. It further highlights commercial speech and professional speech,
as well as the Ninth Circuit’s creation of the Pickup continuum to evaluate
professional speech cases. The Note lays out the precedent regarding speech
related to abortion cases. The Note next discusses A Woman’s Friend and
contrasts that decision with the Evergreen case from the Second Circuit. The
Note concludes that the Second Circuit’s Evergreen case was correctly
decided and that the court in A Woman’s Friend should have followed the
reasoning in Evergreen, striking down California’s Act.
II. BACKGROUND: FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO
MODERN COMPELLED SPEECH DOCTRINE
The First Amendment’s application has grown from protecting the right
to speak to also protecting the right not to speak. This right not to speak is
often referred to as the compelled speech doctrine. This doctrine has grown
over the years, and has been split up into many categories. In a compelled
speech case, the court must decide what category of speech is implicated
and which standard of review should be applied. For instance, commercial
speech is subject to a four-part test, whereas regular compelled speech
generally receives heightened scrutiny. As may be expected, the circuits are
not always consistent in how they handle categories and standards of
review; nor are they consistent in how they apply the facts to the standards
of review. When abortion is involved, the courts have become even more
conflicted.
A. The First Amendment Basis
The First Amendment forbids Congress from “abridging the freedom of
speech.”11 Originally, the Bill of Rights only applied to the federal
government. After the Civil War and the passage of the Fourteenth

10. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.”).
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Amendment, the Supreme Court found that many of the rights found in the
Bill of Rights are incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, forcing the
states to acknowledge certain rights. Near the beginning of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court declared the freedom of speech to be a
fundamental right, which is only restricted in the face of a “clear and
present danger.”12 Once the fundamental right was established, the
challenge of determining when and how it applied in different situations
began.
B. The Supreme Court Recognizes the Compelled Speech Doctrine
In 1943, during World War II, the Supreme Court recognized that the
First Amendment protected both the right to speak as well as the right not
to speak. Though first applied to educational settings, the compelled speech
doctrine has now been applied to license plates, government grants, and
professional institutions. The compelled speech doctrine was first
enunciated in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.13
1. The Compelled Speech Doctrine Forms
In 1943, the Supreme Court recognized that the freedom to speak implies
the freedom not to speak.14 Earlier, in 1942, the West Virginia legislature
required all of its schools to conduct courses in a way that would foster the
“principles and spirit of Americanism.”15 As a result, the children at school
were required to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag.16
However, some students, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, did not salute
because they believed the flag was an image.17 According to the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, saluting an image violates the second commandment of Exodus

12. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent.”).
13. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
14. Id. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The right of freedom of thought and of religion
as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the right to speak freely
and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except insofar as essential operations of
government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society . . . .”).
15. Id. at 625.
16. Id. at 627-29.
17. Id. at 629-30.
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20:4-5.18 Thus, for religious reasons, the Jehovah’s Witnesses would not
partake in a mandatory act of American patriotism.
The Supreme Court declared that this requirement to pledge allegiance
to the American flag violated a fundamental right as applied to the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment.19 The Court declared, “If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”20 The Court reasoned that the right to differ on important matters
that “touch the heart of the existing order” shows that the right is not “a
mere shadow of freedom.”21
The Court made this decision in spite of its recent ruling in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis.22 Since the Court had upheld the mandatory
pledge of allegiance in schools only three years earlier in Gobitis, Justice
Black and Justice Douglas found it appropriate to add a concurring opinion
justifying their change of mind.23 Aside from violating speech rights, they
also viewed the mandatory pledge as violating the freedom of religion.24
They reasoned that the mandatory pledge of allegiance was a “form of test
oath” that has “always been abhorrent in the United States.”25 Justices Black
and Douglas concluded that the mandatory pledge was “inconsistent with

18. Id. at 629. “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any
thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the
earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am
a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth
generation of them that hate me.” Exodus 20:4-5 (KJV).
19. The Court stated that:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
20. Id. at 642.
21. Id. at 642.
22. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
23. Id. at 643 (Black, Douglas, J.J., concurring).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 644.
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our Constitution’s plan and purpose.”26 In the end, the Court overruled
Gobitis, thereby creating a precedent for the compelled speech doctrine.27
2. Expanding the Compelled Speech Doctrine in Wooley v. Maynard28
In Wooley, the Supreme Court declared that making a citizen promote a
state’s message on his license plate—essentially becoming a “mobile
billboard”—violated the compelled speech doctrine.29 Since 1969, New
Hampshire had required license plates to display the state motto: “Live Free
or Die.”30 A Jehovah’s Witness covered up the state motto because he
disagreed with the political message.31 On the second offense, the defendant
was sentenced with a fifty dollar fine and six months in the Grafton County
House of Correction.32 The Court framed the issue as whether the State
could make a person display the state’s message on his private property in a
place where it could be observed by the public.33
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, declaring
unconstitutional the mandate to display the state motto on an individual’s
license plate.34 The Court declared that the “right to speak and the right to
refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”35 While the Court admitted that
the majority of Americans would deem the statute acceptable, it reasoned
that the First Amendment protects the rights of those who differ with the
views of the majority.36 Thus, the state could not commandeer its citizens to

26. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 644. Black and Douglas said, “The ceremonial, when enforced
against conscientious objectors, more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, is a
handy implement for disguised religious persecution.” Id.
27. Id. at 642.
28. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
29. Id. at 715.
30. Id. at 707.
31. Id. at 707-08.
32. Id. at 708. On the first offense, the defendant had been fined twenty-five dollars. Id.
33. The Court provided the following holding:
We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may constitutionally
require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological
message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the
express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the
State may not do so.
Id. at 713
34. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
35. Id. at 714.
36. Id. at 715.
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advertise the state’s message, even when the message was on a state-issued
license plate.
3. Removing the Disagreement Requirement in AID v. Open Society37
As the Court dealt with compelled speech cases, it sometimes removed
what were thought to be essential elements required for the compelled
speech doctrine to apply. For instance, in AID v. Open Society, the Court
decided that the individual does not need to disagree with the government
message in order to be justified in not saying the message.38 In that case, the
Supreme Court dealt with the Leadership Act of 2003, an act that was
designed to combat HIV/AIDS overseas; Congress attached funding to a
mandate that the accepting organization declare that it opposes prostitution
and sex trafficking.39 Some corporations feared that making such a
declaration would alienate them from certain governments that they
worked with.40
The Court struck down the mandate in the Leadership Act.41 While the
Court recognized the policy that Congress wanted to achieve, it maintained
that there is “a basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of speech
prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.’”42
Congress could not require these organizations to “pledge allegiance to the
Government’s policy of eradicating prostitution.”43 The Court reasoned that
Congress violated the compelled speech doctrine when it required the
organizations to “profess a specific belief.”44
AID shows how far the compelled speech doctrine can extend. For the
compelled speech doctrine to apply, the organization may even believe the
message that the state wants to promote. But for business reasons, the
organization may simply not want to say the message. Under the compelled
speech doctrine, the organization would still be protected by the First
Amendment.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2326.
Id.
Id. at 2332.
Id. at 2327 (internal citations omitted).
Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2332.
Id. at 2330.
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C. Categories of the Compelled Speech Doctrine
The compelled speech doctrine has been applied in various situations,
and the courts have struggled with determining the extent of its application
and the level of scrutiny to apply. To help aid the courts, the Supreme Court
has created certain categories of compelled speech and has assigned them
general levels of scrutiny. With professional speech, courts generally apply
either strict or intermediate scrutiny. With commercial speech, courts apply
a four-part test.
1. Professional Speech
The professional speech doctrine deals with how extensively the state
may regulate the speech of professionals who are licensed by the state. The
Supreme Court has not officially recognized the existence of the
professional speech doctrine, but Justice Jackson and Justice White have
mentioned it in concurring opinions. These two justices no longer serve on
the Supreme Court, and with only their two concurring opinions to rely on,
some circuits have defined professional speech doctrines for their
jurisdictions. For instance, the Ninth Circuit has created the Pickup factors
in an attempt to deal with professional speech.
a. Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins45
Justice Jackson was the first of the two Supreme Court justices to
mention the professional speech doctrine. In Thomas v. Collins, Justice
Jackson illustrated his view of the professional speech doctrine with his
belief that a “state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a
vocation.”46 He thought the state “could not stop an unlicensed person from
making a speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other
kind of right, including recommending that his hearers organize to support
his views.”47 Considering the medical field, Justice Jackson stated that “the
state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its
license, but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to
speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.”48

45.
46.
47.
48.

Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945).
Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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b. Justice White in Lowe v. S.E.C.49
Crediting Justice Jackson’s guidance from Thomas, Justice White
suggested in Lowe v. S.E.C. that one “who takes the affairs of a client
personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client
in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances is properly
viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession.”50 Justice White reasoned
that just “as offer and acceptance are communications incidental to the
regulable [sic] transaction called a contract, the professional’s speech is
incidental to the conduct of the profession.”51
Justice White went on to say that the state has legitimate power to license
those who would practice a profession, and that this is “no more subject to
constitutional attack than state-imposed limits on those who may practice
the professions of law and medicine.”52 Justice White finished by saying that
applying the act’s enforcement provisions “to prevent unregistered persons
from engaging in the business of publishing investment advice for the
benefit of any who would purchase their publications, however, is a direct
restraint on freedom of speech and of the press subject to the searching
scrutiny called for by the First Amendment.”53
Thus, while Justices Jackson and White believed that professional speech
should be a category of compelled speech, they have not given the circuits
much guidance in how it should be applied. This has led circuits like the
Ninth Circuit to form their own tests or continuums. Such circuit-created
tests will stand until the Supreme Court either accepts or rejects them.
c. The Ninth Circuit and the Pickup Factors
The Ninth Circuit has developed the Pickup factors in order to determine
the level of scrutiny that should be applied when the speech occurs in the
context of medical regulation. In Pickup v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit
resolved a conflict between two of its district courts regarding the place of
professional speech.54 Both district court cases dealt with California’s Senate
Bill 1172, which banned psychotherapists from sexual orientation change
efforts (“SOCE”) of patients under the age of eighteen.55
49. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985).
50. Id. at 232 (White, J., concurring).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 233.
53. Id.
54. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2871 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014).
55. Id. at 1223.
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When this law was challenged on First Amendment grounds, the two
district courts applied different levels of scrutiny and came to different
conclusions. One district court held that the law was subject to strict
scrutiny because it restricted the content of speech and particular
viewpoints, a fact that was not changed by reason of it being a professional
regulation.56 This district court granted relief because it held that the state
was unlikely to satisfy strict scrutiny.57 In the other district court case, the
court found that the case was about treatment rather than speech.58 Thus,
the court applied only a rational basis level of scrutiny, and found that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail, so it denied relief.59 The two courts came
to different results because they used different standards of review.
To resolve this conflict, the Ninth Circuit discussed two precedent cases
and distilled their reasoning down into what is known as the Pickup
factors.60 The court declared that communication that occurs during
psychoanalysis is speech, and thus entitled to First Amendment protection;
the court reasoned that such speech was not immune from regulation,
especially given “California’s strong interest in regulating mental health,” an
interest that the court declared a “valid exercise of its police power.”61
To determine the level of scrutiny, the court laid out a continuum.62 On
one end of the continuum, the highest level of scrutiny applies when the
professional is “engaged in a public dialogue,” such as when a doctor
advocates an unpopular treatment.63 At the midpoint of the continuum, the
First Amendment protections are “somewhat diminished” when the speech
occurs within the “confines of a professional relationship”; the court
admitted that speech outside of the professional relationship would “almost
certainly be considered impermissible compelled speech.”64 And at the
other end of the continuum, the First Amendment affords the least
protection where the regulation regards professional conduct, which the
court declared to only have an incidental effect on speech.65

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1224.
Id.
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Brown, 740 F.3d at 1227.
Id. at 1226.
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1229.

2017]

STATE ADVERTISING OF ABORTION

245

The court compared the state’s ban of a particular treatment of words
with banning a particular drug.66 It found that this case only called for a
rational basis level of review.67 Accordingly, the court held that the law only
prohibited licensed health providers from engaging in conversion therapy
with minors, and thus satisfied rational basis scrutiny.68
The creation of the Pickup factors came with a strong dissent from three
judges who wanted to hear the case en banc.69 The dissent declared that
there was a false distinction between “conduct” and “speech.”70 It asserted
that the “government’s ipse dixit cannot transform ‘speech’ into ‘conduct’
that it may more freely regulate.”71 It later proclaimed that the “legislatures
cannot nullify the First Amendment’s protections for speech by playing this
labeling game.”72
The dissent further warned that the Supreme Court has disapproved of
the inferior courts carving out categories where the First Amendment
would not apply.73 Since the Ninth Circuit did not find any cases holding
that professional speech did not actually constitute “speech” under the First
Amendment, the dissent declared that the Ninth Circuit should not be
surprised if the Supreme Court did not recognize the new category.74 Due to
the split in the circuits, the dissent may see its prediction come true.
2. Commercial Speech
The commercial speech doctrine relates to speech that is economic in
nature, such as advertising. With commercial speech, the courts apply a test
higher than minimal scrutiny. Commercial speech is admittedly difficult for
the courts to apply. Thus, a test has been developed to determine whether
speech falls under the commercial speech doctrine. It is very difficult for a
plaintiff to win in a compelled speech challenge that is classified under the
commercial speech doctrine. Therefore, this lower standard of review is
desired by the state when defending its statutes.

66. Brown, 740 F.3d at 1229.
67. Id. at 1231.
68. Id. at 1229. (“Pursuant to its police power, California has authority to regulate
licensed mental health providers’ administration of therapies that the legislature has deemed
harmful.”).
69. Id. at 1215.
70. Id. at 1216.
71. Id.
72. Brown, 740 F.3d at 1218.
73. Id. at 1221.
74. Id.
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a. Zauderer and Identifying Commercial Speech75
For commercial speech, the Court only requires that a statute satisfy a
four-part test. In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the state
required lawyers to insert information in their advertisements that clients
would be liable for significant litigation costs, even if the lawsuit were
unsuccessful.76 The Court held that such a state rule was valid under the
First Amendment, noting that the state only wanted the lawyers to add a
little more information to advertisements.77 Hence, the Supreme Court
clarified that some state laws that compel speech may violate the First
Amendment, but other compelled speech is permissible when the State only
attempts to “prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising.”78
With advertising, the Court only requires that the law be “reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing” customers from being
deceived.79 Thus, while one “may not be disciplined for soliciting legal
business through printed advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive
information and advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients,”80 that
person is not afforded the same level of protection for “commercial speech”
as he would receive under “noncommercial speech.”81
b. Central Hudson Gas and the Four-Part Test82
Once the Supreme Court recognized commercial speech as a special
form of speech with less protections, it tried to define it. In Central Hudson
Gas, the Court defined commercial speech as an “expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”83 With
commercial speech, the Court balanced its fear of becoming “highly
paternalistic” with the state’s interest in protecting consumers.84
When addressing this situation, the Court balanced these interests with a
four-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the First
Amendment protects the expression.85 For commercial speech, this requires
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 566.
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that the expression be lawful and not misleading.86 Second, the court must
consider whether the government interest is substantial.87 Only when both
of these questions are answered in the affirmative will the court consider the
next two parts of the test: “whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.”88 Since this test is very deferential to the
state, the state has an obvious incentive to argue that it applies in any given
case.
D. Compelled Speech Applied to the Abortion Issue
Regarding abortion, the courts often look to Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.89 In that case, the Court mentioned the
compelled speech doctrine near the end of the opinion in a short
paragraph.90 The Circuits have debated the meaning of that short paragraph
and have come to different conclusions, especially regarding the level of
scrutiny that should be applied in cases surrounding abortion clinics.
1. The Supreme Court References the Compelled Speech Doctrine in
Casey
In Casey, the Court considered a state statute’s informed consent
mandate requiring that, before an abortion, the physician must make
available certain printed materials describing the unborn baby and other
information such as a list of other services that serve as alternatives to
abortion.91 Regarding the First Amendment’s compelled speech doctrine,
the Court dealt with the issue in a short paragraph, stating that the
“physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated . . . but
only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State . . . .”92 The Court further clarified, “[w]e see no
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the
information mandated by the State here.”93 This short analysis has led to a
circuit split, since different circuits have come to different conclusions as to
the extent of its meaning and application.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 884.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 884.
Id.
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2. The Circuits Interpret the Supreme Court
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits are split as to what level of scrutiny should
be used when a state regulates the disclosures an abortion doctor must
make. The Fifth Circuit held that Casey dictated that informed consent laws
did not violate the compelled speech doctrine.94 The Fourth Circuit, on the
other hand, held that Casey did not dictate any standard in that short
paragraph, and further declared that a higher scrutiny should be used.95 In
that case, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny and struck down
the statute.96
a. The Fifth Circuit: Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion
Services. v. Lakey97
In Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey, the
Fifth Circuit applied a rational basis review to Texas’s statute requiring
informed consent by women who undergo abortions.98 After considering
Casey, the Fifth Circuit asserted that the Supreme Court upheld an
“informed-consent statute over precisely the same ‘compelled speech’
challenges made here.”99 The court noted that the Supreme Court explained
that informed-consent statutes helped women comprehend the full
consequence of their decision, and the statute also furthered the State’s
interest in protecting life.100 When the Fifth Circuit evaluated Casey, the
court declared that the Supreme Court’s response to compelled speech
under this situation is “clearly not a strict scrutiny analysis.”101
b. The Fourth Circuit in Stuart v. Camnitz102
Taking a different view than Lakey, the Fourth Circuit, in Stuart v.
Camnitz, claimed that the Fifth Circuit read too much into Casey.103 The

94. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576-77 (5th
Cir. 2012).
95. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 245 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. WalkerMcGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
96. Id.
97. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir.
2012).
98. Id. at 575.
99. Id. at 574.
100. Id. at 575.
101. Id.
102. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker-McGill
v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).
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Fourth Circuit did not believe that the Casey holding was a “particularized
finding” and, thus, did not apply to “every subsequent compelled speech
case involving abortion.”104 Because Casey (under the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation) did not establish a level of scrutiny, the Fourth Circuit
considered its heightened intermediate level of scrutiny to be consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.105
c.

The Second Circuit and Mandatory Disclosures: Evergreen106

In contrast to certain states trying to force disclosures regarding services,
other states have attempted to advertise their programs by state law. In
Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, the Second Circuit considered whether
New York City could mandate pregnancy service centers to inform
potential clients about the centers and the services that New York City
provided or did not provide.107 The New York City Council passed a law
that imposed on pregnancy service centers certain confidentiality
requirements and mandatory disclosures, such as (1) whether the
pregnancy service center had a licensed medical provider who directly
supervised the organization (the “Status Disclosure”), (2) that the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene encourages women who
are or who may be pregnant to consult with a licensed provider (the
“Government Message”), and (3) whether the organization “provide or
provide referrals for abortion,” emergency contraception, or prenatal care
(the “Services Disclosure”).108 The law required that the pregnancy service
centers provide the required disclosures at their entrances and waiting
rooms, on advertisements, and during telephone conversations.109 If this law
was violated, it provided civil fines and granted authority to the
Commissioner of Consumer Affairs to close down the center.110
The Evergreen Association, Inc. and three other pregnancy resource
centers moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking

103. Id. at 249.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Evergreen Ass’n v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub
nom. Evergreen Ass’n, v. City of New York , 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom.
Pregnancy Care Ctr. of N.Y. v. City of New York , 135 S. Ct. 435 (2014).
107. Id. at 239.
108. Id. at 238.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 238-39.
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effect.111 They claimed that the law violated their First Amendment free
speech rights.112 Evergreen provides pregnancy-related services that include
pregnancy testing, counseling, ultrasounds, and sonograms.113 On appeal,
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court, regarding mandated forms,
and held that the law violated the plaintiff’s free speech rights.114 Regarding
the level of scrutiny, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the district court
had rejected the defendant’s arguments for a level of scrutiny lower than
strict scrutiny.115 These arguments included comparisons to campaign
finance regulations, regulation of licensed physicians, and commercial
speech.116
The Second Circuit reasoned that it did not need to resolve the level of
scrutiny because the result would be the same under both intermediate and
strict scrutiny.117 The court found that the Government Message and
Service Disclosure violated the First Amendment, but the Status Disclosure
was constitutional.118 Regarding Status Disclosures, the court held that this
provision survived strict scrutiny because it is the “least restrictive means to
ensure that a woman is aware” that a particular pregnancy services center
has a licensed medical provider “at the time that she first interacts with
it.”119 Regarding the Services Disclosure, the court found that the Services
Disclosures overly burdened Plaintiff’s speech, especially under strict
scrutiny.120
The court reasoned that the context of the speech dealt with a “public
debate over the morality and efficacy of contraception and abortions.”121
The court further reasoned that a requirement that pregnancy services
centers address abortion, emergency contraception, or prenatal care when
they first meet potential clients alters the center’s political speech “by
mandating the manner in which the discussion of these issues begins.”122

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 242.
Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 242.
Id.
Id. at 237-38.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 245.
Id. at 246-47.
Id. at 249.
Id.
Id.
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Under intermediate scrutiny, the court reasoned that the law would still
be invalid because of the nature of the political speech and “the fact that the
Status Disclosure provides a more limited alternative regulation.”123
Regarding the Government Message, the court held that it is insufficiently
tailored to withstand scrutiny.124 The court was concerned that pregnancy
centers were being required to advertise for the City pursuant to New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene.125 The court declared that
the government cannot mandate that a person espouse a government
position on a contested public issue.126
III. PROBLEM: A WOMAN’S FRIEND PREGNANCY RESOURCE CLINIC V.
HARRIS
Once again, the compelled speech doctrine has found itself caught in an
abortion conflict. In A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Resource Clinic v. Harris,
the question was whether a state can make a pro-life organization inform
everyone who walks into its office that the state provides low cost
abortions.127 Pro-life institutions challenged this statute as a violation of the
First Amendment under both the compelled speech doctrine and the Free
Exercise Clause.128
A. Overview of the Case
California passed an act mandating organizations that perform
pregnancy testing to inform their clients that California provides low-cost
access to abortions.129 A Women’s Friend Pregnancy Resource Clinic (“A
Woman’s Friend”), a pro-life organization, challenged California’s
statute.130 This pro-life institution claimed that the statute violated the
compelled speech doctrine and First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.131

123. Id. at 250.
124. Evergreen Ass’n, 740 F.3d at 251.
125. Id. at 250.
126. Id. at 251.
127. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1178-79
(E.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d sub nom. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Res. Clinic v. Harris, 669 F.
App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2016).
128. Id. at 1179.
129. Id. at 1179-80.
130. Id. at 1179.
131. Id.
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1. The Statute: Reproductive FACT Act
The California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive
Care, and Transparency Act (“the Act”) requires “licensed covered
facilit[ies]” to post a notice saying, “California has public programs that
provide immediate free or low-cost access to comprehensive family
planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception),
prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you
qualify, contact the county social services office . . . .”132 The Act requires
that the notice be disclosed in the following ways: posted in “a conspicuous
place where individuals wait that may be easily read by those seeking
services from the facility”; printed and distributed “to all clients in no less
than 14-point type”; or provide digital notice “distributed to all clients that
can be read at the time of check-in or arrival.”133
The Act defines “licensed covered facilities” as facilities that offer
“pregnancy testing or pregnancy diagnosis” or that “advertise or solicit
patrons with offers to provide prenatal sonography, pregnancy tests, or
pregnancy options counseling.”134 The Act also applies to a facility that has
“staff or volunteers who collect health information from clients.”135 The Act
imposes civil penalties of $500 for the first offense and $1,000 for
subsequent offenses.136
2. A Woman’s Friend Pregnancy Resources Clinic
A Woman’s Friend is a non-profit religious corporation licensed under
the California Health and Safety Code.137 A Woman’s Friend was organized
for “the express purpose of providing alternatives to abortion for women
experiencing unplanned pregnancies.”138 A Woman’s Friend believes that
the Bible is the Word of God and that Jesus is the savior of the world.139
Thus, A Woman’s Friend “requires its employees, volunteers, and board
members to read and sign a statement of faith.”140

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1180.
A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1180.
Id. at 1179-80.
Id. at 1180.
Id.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1184.
Id.
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Regarding its operation, A Woman’s Friend consists of medical doctors,
a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology, and several registered nurses.141 A
Woman’s Friend offers services such as pre-parenting classes as well as
“used and new children’s clothing, maternity clothing, baby furniture, and
other childcare supplies.”142 A Woman’s Friend directs its clients to nurses
who administer a pregnancy test, and the nurses teach the clients about
“prenatal health and well-being, nutrition, and fetal development and offers
to perform a limited first trimester ultrasound.”143 A Woman’s Friend
argues that the Act compels it to “make a statement” contradicting both its
“religious belief and the purposes of [its] formation.”144
B. Legal Issues Addressed by the District Court
The district court in A Woman’s Friend decided that the case involved
speech, not just conduct.145 The district court then declared that the speech
fell into the category of professional speech, not commercial speech.146 The
court held that intermediate scrutiny applied and the statute survived this
standard.147 The court also analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard and
declared that the statute would meet this standard as well.148
1. Speech Versus Conduct
At trial, A Woman’s Friend contended that strict scrutiny should be
applied because “the required notice amounts to a content-based
regulation.”149 On the other hand, the state argued that a lesser level of
scrutiny should be applied, such as compelled commercial speech or
professional speech.150 The district court found that the “Act regulates
professional speech within the confines of the patient-provider relationship,
which is reviewed under no greater than intermediate scrutiny.”151

141.
142.
143.
144.
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146.
147.
148.
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151.

Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
Id. at 1190.
A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1195.
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2. Commercial Speech
The court dispensed with the state’s argument regarding commercial
speech.152 It reasoned that under Central Hudson Gas, commercial speech
resulted when the expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker.153 It also examined the compelled speech doctrine as seen in Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina.154 In Riley,155 the state
required that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors the
percentage of the donation retained by the organization (not making it to
the charity’s target).156 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth
Circuit and found that the statute violated the compelled speech doctrine.157
The Court reasoned that the statute mandated speech that the speaker
would not want to say.158 The Court maintained that the case could not be
separated from other compelled speech cases because the compelled
statements were facts.159 Thus, the Court found that the state’s regulation “is
subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny.”160 The Court maintained
that the statute was unduly burdensome and not narrowly tailored.161
The district court found this case more closely related to Riley than to the
commercial speech cases.162 The court noted that when speech is
“inextricably intertwined” with protected speech, the court views the speech
as fully protected.163 Thus, the court ruled that A Woman’s Friend’s speech
was more than economic, because it was “integrally connected to their
religious and political beliefs, and the speech required by the Act brushe[d]
up against a controversial public debate revolving around abortion.”164
Therefore, the court concluded that, because the speech was not
commercial speech, the test in Zauderer did not apply.165
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Id. at 784.
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3. Professional Speech
After deciding that the Commercial Speech doctrine did not apply, the
court then held that the Act regulated professional speech.166 The court
noted that the Act’s “primary purpose is to communicate information to
patients about reproductive medical services.”167 Therefore, the court
applied the Pickup continuum.168
While the court referenced the Casey decision, it decided that Casey did
not provide enough guidance.169 And the court acknowledged that the
“framework for professional speech remained murky at best.”170 The court
also acknowledged the split in the circuits, and noted that the
interpretations would inevitably vary significantly when based on a single
paragraph of guidance from the Supreme Court.171
The district court next used the Pickup continuum from Pickup v.
Brown172 to decide what level of scrutiny to apply.173 In the Pickup
continuum, the First Amendment protects professionals engaged “in public
dialogue on matters of public concern,” and it provides the least protection
where the state regulates professional conduct.174 Between these two poles,
the district court listed examples such as “consent requirements, licensing
requirements, professional disciplinary proceedings, and negligence
actions.”175
Applying this Pickup continuum, the district court reasoned that the Act
did not stop any professionals from engaging in public dialogue.176 The
court described the compelled speech as “truthful, nonmisleading
information to clinics’ clients.”177 The court maintained that the Act’s
purpose is to “regulate[] speech within the confines of a professional
relationship,” not to suppress a message.178 Further, the court found that the
166. Id. at 1203.
167. Id.
168. A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1203.
169. Id. at 1204.
170. Id. at 1200.
171. Id. at 1204-05.
172. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014),
and cert. denied sub nom. Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014).
173. A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1202.
174. Id. at 1202.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1203.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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midpoint of the continuum received “somewhat diminished” First
Amendment protection, but the level of protection was not specified.179
Thus, the court analyzed the case as a professional speech case at the
midpoint of the Ninth Circuit’s Pickup continuum with “somewhat
diminished” First Amendment protection.
C. Levels of Scrutiny and Application
After consulting the Fourth and Fifth Amendment for guidance on what
level of scrutiny to apply, the district court decided that this case fell under
intermediate scrutiny.180 It then found that the Act satisfied intermediate
scrutiny.181 Finally, the district court analyzed the case under strict scrutiny,
and found that the Act satisfied strict scrutiny as well.182
1. The Court Analyzes with Intermediate Scrutiny
The district court stated that the Act would survive intermediate scrutiny
if it (1) directly advanced a substantial government interest and (2) was
narrowly “drawn to achieve that interest.”183 The court held that the Act
survived intermediate scrutiny.184 The court reasoned that the Act’s purpose
is to inform California residents of “their rights and the health care
resources available to them” regarding reproductive health care.185 The
court maintained that California had a strong interest in women knowing
“the range of health care options available to them.”186 The court stated that
the California legislature found that thousands of women did not know of
the public programs.187 The court found that the Act advanced this
substantial government interest.188
Next, the court found that the Act is narrowly “drawn to achieve that
interest and does not overly burden speech.”189 The court reasoned that the
term “abortion” was surrounded by many words that dealt with other
179. A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1203-04 (citing Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d
1208, 1228 (9th Cir.)).
180. Id. at 1207.
181. Id. at 1206.
182. Id. at 1208.
183. Id. at 1206 (citing Sorrel v. IMS Health Inc., 54 U.S. 552, 572 (2011)).
184. Id.
185. A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1206.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1207.
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California provided health care services unrelated to abortions.190 The court
noted that every institution is still free to advocate its viewpoint, including
any disagreement with the statute.191 The court also emphasized the
different options that the Act gave the organization to inform its clients of
California’s provision of low-cost abortion.192 The court held that this
evidence showed that the Act is narrowly drawn to achieve its interest and
provide “manageable options.”193
2. The Court Analyzes with Strict Scrutiny
The district court stated that the Act passes strict scrutiny if (1) it is
“narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest,” and (2) it
uses the “least restrictive means to achieve its ends.”194 Concluding that
California’s interest is likely a compelling governmental interest, the court
held that the Act survives strict scrutiny.195 The court maintained that other
methods, such as persuading private institutions to spread the desired
information or the government disseminating the information itself, were
not “the most effective” to ensure women “quickly obtain . . . publically
funded family planning and pregnancy-related resources available in
California” at the time that these decisions are being made.196 Since
pregnancy decisions are time-sensitive, the court held that the Act’s
required notice passed strict scrutiny.197
3. The Court Distinguishes A Woman’s Friend from Evergreen198
The district court claimed that it had considered the Second Circuit’s
Evergreen case, but then asserted that Evergreen did not change the court’s
conclusion.199 While the court noted that the Second Circuit struck down
the government message because it overly burdened speech and mandated
pregnancy centers to “affirmatively espouse the government’s position on a
contested public issue,”200 the court distinguished the Act’s notice
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requirements from the disclosures in Evergreen.201 The court reasoned that
the Act seeks to advance a different government interest.202
The district court claimed that the Act resembles informed consent cases
rather than free speech cases because the Act informs women of the free
and low-cost publicly funded health services available to them “at the time
they are making their time-sensitive reproductive decisions.”203 The court
further distinguished A Woman’s Friend from Evergreen based on the
language of the two statutes.204 The court reasoned that the notice in the Act
only provided facts of health services available, which was unlike the
Government Message in Evergreen wherein the government encouraged
women to consult a licensed provider.205 Moreover, unlike the requirement
in Evergreen that the centers were required to provide the disclosures at the
beginning of each contact with a client, the Act only required that the
message be posted on a wall.206 Thus, the court held that the Act’s burden of
speech did not match the burden in Evergreen.
4. The Ninth Circuit Affirms the Result of the District Court
In a similar case regarding the same statute, the Ninth Circuit, in
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, upheld the Act.207
Several pro-life organizations challenged the Act, but the district court held
that these organizations were unlikely to succeed on their free speech
claim.208 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court.209
In deciding the level of scrutiny, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that, even
though the Act engaged in content-based discrimination, strict scrutiny did
not apply.210 The court looked to Casey, specifically where the Supreme
201. Id. at 1209.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1209.
206. Id.
207. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 845 (9th Cir. 2016). I
chose to describe the Harris case, a contemporaneous case with A Woman’s Friend, because
the Ninth Circuit analyzed the arguments from A Woman’s Friend. For A Woman’s Friend,
the Ninth Circuit dedicated less than ten sentences in affirming, and merely cited the Harris
case for the First Amendment argument. Thus, if the Supreme Court overrules the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in A Woman’s Friend, it will also be overruling the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Harris.
208. Id. at 832.
209. Id. at 845.
210. Id. at 836.
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Court had said that the practice of medicine is “subject to reasonable
licensing and regulation by the State.”211 The Ninth Circuit discussed several
cases such as Stuart and Lakey to show that strict scrutiny is not always
applied to compelled speech cases concerning abortion-related
disclosures.212 Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied its own framework using the
Pickup factors. It concluded that the licensed notice is professional speech,
subject to intermediate scrutiny, because the licensed notices fell at the
midpoint of the Pickup continuum.213 The court expanded the professional
speech doctrine to include not only the words of the professional, but also
the words of the other staff members, and even what information is placed
in the waiting room.214
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the licensed notices survived
intermediate scrutiny.215 It declared that California had a substantial interest
in the health of its citizens.216 This interest includes that citizens have
adequate access to information about “constitutionally-protected medical
services like abortion.”217 The court further concluded that the licensed
notice was narrowly tailored to achieve California’s interest.218 The court
reasoned that the notice only informed the reader of the existence of
publicly-funded family planning services.219 The court deemed this to be
reasonable and sufficient for intermediate scrutiny, but it acknowledged
that the Second and Fourth Circuits had applied strict scrutiny in similar
cases and had found similar laws to not be narrowly tailored.220 In the end,
the Ninth Circuit declared that its lower standard of review allowed the Act
to survive scrutiny.
IV. EVERGREEN MUST PREVAIL
While the Pickup continuum of the Ninth Circuit creates a lower level of
scrutiny similar to intermediate scrutiny, the debate is not what standard of
review should be used. The debate regards how the standard of review is
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applied to the statute at issue. Both A Woman’s Friend and Evergreen
applied strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny to similar facts, but came
to opposite conclusions. The district court in A Woman’s Friend declared
that the state satisfied both strict and intermediate scrutiny, but the Second
Circuit in Evergreen held that the state failed under both. The solution to
resolving the conflict between A Woman’s Friend and the Second Circuit’s
Evergreen case is to simply follow the reasoning of the Second Circuit in
Evergreen.
A. The Act Is Not Distinguished from the Evergreen Case
While the court in A Woman’s Friend claimed to distinguish its case
from the situation in Evergreen, the cases are not distinguishable. Much of
the reasoning and policy concerns from Evergreen would be equally
offended by the Act in California. Thus, because Evergreen found that the
statute in its case failed both intermediate and strict scrutiny, the situation
in A Woman’s Friend should likewise fail under both strict and intermediate
scrutiny.
1. The State Is Commandeering a Private Organization for
Advertising
The Second Circuit in Evergreen was concerned that the state was
commandeering a private organization to advertise on behalf of the state.221
The district court in A Woman’s Friend did not deny that the state of
California is using private organizations to promote a state-funded
government program. Thus, it is admitted that California is forcing pro-life
facilities to be rooms of advertising for California programs.
According to Evergreen, this commandeering offends the Constitution
even if it is clear that the message is known to come from the
government.222 To support this, the Second Circuit relied on Wooley v.
Maynard, a case in which the Supreme Court declared that the state could
not force its citizens to become advertising billboards for the state.223 In A
Woman’s Friend, the advertising billboard of Wooley has been moved from
public view on the road to the inside wall of a private organization. The
Court in Wooley declared that the private individual’s ability to disagree
with the message on his car was not sufficient to allow the state to compel
the speech. Thus, it is similarly not sufficient that the private organizations
in A Woman’s Friend can openly disagree with the message.
221. Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 250 (2d Cir. 2014).
222. Id.
223. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977).

2017]

STATE ADVERTISING OF ABORTION

261

Furthermore, the district court in A Woman’s Friend reasoned that the
mandated speech is less burdensome than in Evergreen because the Act
states that the organization can put the message on a wall instead of telling
the customer verbally.224 But, this is a distinction without a difference. The
Act is still forcing the organizations to promote a message with which they
disagree.225 Changing the medium of that message does not solve anything.
That argument is akin to telling a Jehovah’s Witness that he does not have
to say the pledge of allegiance, but he has to put it on his car. Both of these
scenarios in Evergreen and A Woman’s Friend involve a statute that requires
a private organization to declare the message of the state, and both make
private parties affirm a government message to the public.
2. The State Is Forcing a Private Organization to State a Message with
Which It Disagrees
A Woman’s Friend was organized for “the express purpose of providing
alternatives to abortion for women experiencing unplanned pregnancies.”226
And, as shown in AID, honest disagreement is not even required in
compelled speech. In fact, had the organization truly agreed with the
message, but simply declined to promote it, the compelled speech doctrine
would still have applied.
Moreover, the debate over the professional speech doctrine misses the
fact that the organization itself has free speech rights, not just the medical
physicians who work for the organization. While California may be able to
restrict the speech of certain medical personnel, it should not be able to
force an organization to proclaim a message that the organization disagrees
with.
B. The Act Does Not Satisfy Either Strict or Intermediate Scrutiny
The Ninth Circuit created two problems for the district court’s reasoning
in A Woman’s Friend. First, the Ninth Circuit admitted that the Act does
not survive strict scrutiny. Second, the Ninth Circuit erred in stating that
the Second Circuit applied only strict scrutiny. In Evergreen, the Second
Circuit applied both strict and intermediate scrutiny and held that the
statute failed under both.227 Therefore, even though the Ninth Circuit
upheld the overall reasoning of A Woman’s Friend, it undermined it in two
acute areas.
224.
225.
226.
227.

A Woman’s Friend, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1209.
See id. at 1185.
Id. at 1183.
Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233, 245 (2d Cir. 2014).
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As in the Second Circuit’s Evergreen case, the state did not satisfy either
strict or intermediate scrutiny.228 The Second Circuit held that it failed
under both standards, due to the issue being one of public contention.229 It
also failed because there were more limited alternatives, such as
implementing a government advertising campaign.230 Both critiques ring
true in A Woman’s Friend. Abortion is a controversial issue in most of the
United States and, as shown in the facts of the case itself, California is no
exception. The fact that California funds abortions while other private
groups oppose abortions shows that the issue is controversial even within
that state. Further, the use of an advertising campaign is the way the state
should do its own advertising, not commandeering the waiting rooms of
organizations that disagree with the state’s program.
C. The Lesson of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of
California231
California courts have already been reversed in a similar situation
regarding a private organization that was compelled to become an
advertiser for another organization. In Pacific Gas, the California Public
Utility Commission permitted a third party to print information in the
billing statements of Pacific Gas and Electric Company.232 On appeal, the
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the California Supreme Court
with guidance.233 The Supreme Court held that the Commission’s order
“impermissibly burdens” Pacific Gas’s First Amendment rights because it
forces Pacific Gas “to associate with the views of other speakers.”234 The
Court reasoned that the order discriminated based on the viewpoints of the
speakers by allowing a third party to disseminate information on a
company’s billing statement.235 While the state’s interest in “fair and
effective utility regulation” could be compelling, the Court could not find a
substantially relevant correlation between the government interest and the
decision to require another organization to associate with the message of a
third party.236 The Court further found that the regulation was not content
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
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Id. at 245, 249.
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neutral due to the conflicting messages that may result between the
company and the third party.237 The Court found that the order was not
narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.238 It also was not a
valid time, place, or manner regulation.239
Like the third-party speech in Pacific Gas, California is attempting to
make a private organization promote a message with which it disagrees.
When the state tried to hand this ability to a private organization in Pacific
Gas, the Court struck it down under the compelled speech doctrine.240
Likewise, in A Woman’s Friend, the state is attempting to get an
organization to advertise on behalf of a government program. Thus, the
organization would be forced to associate with the message of the
government, a message with which the organization disagrees. Indeed, the
organization is being forced to associate with a message that it was created
to combat. Indeed, common sense dictates that a state should not be able to
force its advertisements into any facility, especially those places designed to
counteract that advertisement. Thus, the plight of A Woman’s Friend is
even greater than that of the gas company in Pacific Gas.
Moreover, the disagreement and communication is more visible in A
Woman’s Friend than it was in Pacific Gas. In Pacific Gas, the conflicting
message was buried in the billing statement, among the extra papers that its
customers likely did not even read. In A Woman’s Friend, however, the
message would be put in the waiting room where customers are trying to
find something to do or read. That is why doctors provide magazines for
their customers to peruse. In fact, the reason that the state wants this
message printed in the waiting room is to reach the organization’s
customers.241 The state argued that doing so helped get its message to its
desired target group, those making “time-sensitive reproductive
decisions.”242
The disagreement with the message is stronger in A Woman’s Friend
than it was in Pacific Gas. The Court in Pacific Gas overturned the
Commission on the grounds that a conflicting message may result. In A
Woman’s Friend, the disagreement with the message is inherent and
obvious. The message that the state of California provides abortions goes
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against the stated purpose of the organization, causing the organization to
challenge the compulsion as soon as it was able.
V. CONCLUSION
In disregarding the guidance of the Evergreen case, the district court in A
Woman’s Friend has erred by finding that the Act satisfied both strict and
intermediate scrutiny. When the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, it created a circuit split between the Ninth and Second Circuit. To
fix this split, the Second Circuit and its Evergreen case should prevail.
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Evergreen is more consistent with the
Supreme Court’s guidance concerning compelled speech cases, recognizing
the policy against states commandeering private organizations for
advertising purposes, and the distaste with forcing a private organization to
proclaim a message with which it disagrees. Further, the California courts
have already been overruled when they tried to force an organization to
spread the message of a third party. Therefore, the decision in A Woman’s
Friend, should be abandoned for the stricter scrutiny applied in the Second
Circuit’s Evergreen case.

